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Abstract 
Grids allow for collaborative e-Research to be 
undertaken, often across institutional and national 
boundaries. Typically this is through the establishment 
of virtual organizations (VOs) where policies on access 
and usage of resources across partner sites are defined 
and subsequently enforced. For many VOs, these 
agreements have been lightweight and erred on the side 
of flexibility with minimal constraints on the kinds of 
jobs a user is allowed to run or the amount of resources 
that can be consumed. For many new domains such as 
e-Health, such flexibility is simply not tenable. Instead, 
precise definitions of what jobs can be run, and what 
data can be accessed by who need to be defined and 
enforced by sites. The role based access control model 
(RBAC) provides a well researched paradigm for 
controlling access to large scale dynamic VOs. 
However, the standard RBAC model assumes a single 
domain with centralised role management. When RBAC 
is applied to VOs, it does not specify how or where roles 
should be defined or made known to the distributed 
resource sites (who are always deemed to be 
autonomous to make access control decisions). Two 
main possibilities exist based on either a centralized or 
decentralized approach to VO role management. We 
present the advantages and disadvantages of the 
centralized and decentralized role models and describe 
how we have implemented them in a range of security 
focused e-Research domains at the National e-Science 
Centre (NeSC) at the University of Glasgow. 
 
1. Introduction 
Grids and the Grid Computing paradigm provide the 
technological infrastructure to facilitate e-Science and e-
Research. Numerous national and international 
collaborations have successfully shown how Grid 
technologies can support a wide range of research 
including amongst others: seamless access to a range of 
computational resources [1]; linkage of a wide range of 
data resources [2]; exploitation of shared instruments 
such as astronomical telescopes or specialized resources 
such as visualization servers [3]. Indeed there are few 
application domains that have not been exposed to and 
benefited from the exploitation of Grid technologies.  
Given this, it would be expected that a body of 
knowledge exists on how best to apply Grid 
technologies to support e-Research. It is still the case 
however that a variety of choices exist in both the 
interpretation of the Grid computing paradigm, and on 
the technologies that are used to realize Grid based e-
Research infrastructures. Historically, much of the focus 
and effort of Grid computing was based upon 
addressing access to and usage of large scale high 
performance computing (HPC) resources such as cluster 
computers. These access models are typified by their 
predominantly authentication-only based approaches 
which support secure access to an account on a cluster 
where domain specific programs can be compiled 
and/or executed. These approaches are based upon 
X.509 based public key infrastructures (PKI) [4] where 
the public key certificates (PKCs) that bind the 
identities of users to their public keys are issued by 
trusted third parties called certification authorities 
(CAs). Through trusting a CA, sites can validate the 
identity of the individual in possession of the 
corresponding private key. This PKI based approach has 
been adopted in the UK by the National Grid Service 
(NGS) (www.ngs.ac.uk) with the UK certification 
authority based at Rutherford Appleton Laboratory 
(www.grid-support.ac.uk/ca). With this model, end 
users are expected to acquire and manage their own 
private/public key pairs. This is an arduous process for 
many less IT-savvy communities who are put-off by the 
acquisition and management of X.509 PKCs, e.g. they 
may be expected to memorize 16-character long private 
key passwords. The temptation to write down such 
passwords or share them between users also results in a 
reduction of overall security. These issues are described 
in more detail in [5-7].  
It is often the case that research domains and 
resource providers require more information than 
simply the identity of the individual in order to grant 
access to use their resources. The same individual can 
be in multiple collaborative projects each of which is 
based upon a common shared infrastructure. Knowing 
in what context a user is requesting access to a 
particular resource is essential information for a 
resource provider to decide whether the access request 
should be granted or not. This information is typically 
established through the concept of a virtual organization 
(VO). A VO allows the users, their roles and the 
resources they can access in a collaborative project to be 
defined. This information can then be used by 
individual resource providers to decide upon the validity 
of access requests, e.g. through satisfaction of their site 
specific authorization policies. 
There are numerous technologies and standards that 
have been put forward for defining and enforcing 
authorization policies for access to and usage of Grid 
resources [8]. Role based access control (RBAC) is one 
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of the more well established models for describing such 
policies [26], although other models such as attribute 
based, process based, and identity based access control 
also exist and have been implemented [10]. In the 
RBAC model, project/VO specific roles are assigned to 
individuals as part of their membership of a particular 
VO. Possession of a particular role, combined with 
other context information, such as time of day and 
amount of resource being requested, can then be used by 
a resource gatekeeper to decide whether an access 
request is allowed or not. RBAC has numerous 
advantages over existing authentication only based 
models. One of the key advantages is that whilst 
individuals in a VO may come and go, the role itself is 
unlikely to change as much. Consequently RBAC based 
approaches are considered more scalable and 
manageable. The key advantage of RBAC-based 
security models compared to other approaches is that 
privileges and access is determined by roles and 
memberships a user holds and not merely on identity. 
However, the ANSI RBAC model [26] assumes a single 
domain with centralized role management so that 
conflicting roles cannot be issued to users and all 
systems know which roles a user is a member of. These 
assumptions do not necessarily hold true in VOs.  
Many mainstream Grid infrastructures such as the 
UK e-Science NGS have implemented access control 
based primarily on X.509 PKCs. In this model, users 
specifically request access to individual NGS resources 
by quoting their Distinguished Name (DN) which is 
embedded in their X.509 PKC. Their DN is registered in 
a resource maintained grid mapfile which associates 
their DN with a local account on that resource. If a DN 
does not have an associated local account then the local 
gatekeeper will decide that the user does not have 
privileges to run the job.  RBAC models instead allow 
possession of particular roles to determine access 
control decisions.  
It is not realistic to mandate that all resource 
providers should adopt precisely the same security 
policies, nor how end users with different roles should 
access and use grid resources. Each site can/will have 
their own mechanisms for dealing with site specific 
access requests. Indeed the common philosophy 
underlying the Grid is that all resource providers are 
expected to be autonomous, i.e. they may allow/deny 
access requests at their own discretion. Nevertheless, a 
crucial consideration in establishing a VO is whether a 
common understanding of the various roles and their 
associated privileges needs to be established throughout 
the entire VO or not. There are two primary models for 
defining roles specific to a VO: the centralized and 
decentralized models. The focus of this paper is to 
explore these two models and identify their advantages 
and disadvantages through application in security 
focused Grid projects. Key to this is to ensure that the 
models are trialled in realistic, large scale heterogeneous 
Grid environments. To this end we have been working 
with mainstream Grid technologies such as Globus 
toolkit version 4 (www.globus.org/toolkit) and the Open 
Middleware Infrastructure Institute (OMII-UK) 
software (www.omii.ac.uk). Seamless support of the 
two VO role models with Grid middleware is essential, 
and is something we pay special attention to.    
2. Pros and Cons of Centralized vs 
Decentralized VO Role Models 
The centralized model more nearly matches the standard 
RBAC model, and requires all sites to agree upon the 
roles and privileges that are to be used throughout a 
particular VO. In this model, all sites agree in advance 
on the definition and names of the roles that are 
applicable to their particular VO, and the privileges that 
will be assigned to them. A single VO administrator is 
then appointed who will typically assign these roles to 
individuals on a case by case basis when users ask to be 
granted particular roles or permissions in the VO. The 
VO administrator may appoint other administrators to 
help him in this task, but all administrators are 
conceptually equal, in that each can over-ride the 
decisions made by the others. This model of VO role 
administration has been implemented through 
technologies such as the Virtual Organization 
Membership Service (VOMS) [11]. VOMS has gained 
widespread acceptance due to the simple model for 
defining the roles specific to a particular VO and how 
they can be used/enforced. Sites themselves are 
responsible for configuring their resources to use these 
roles. With VOMS, this is implemented with tools such 
as the Local Centre Authorization Service (LCAS) and 
the Local Credential Mapping Service (LCMAPS) [12] 
which map the user role information into group 
identities (gid), user identities (uid) and associated local 
pool accounts established on the local cluster for that 
particular VO. Refinements can be made to this model 
in order to allow more local control over the use of 
resources, e.g. applying file store limits to a particular 
VO. We note that this local enforcement is not explicitly 
defined within the VO policy (given by the definition of 
the roles in the VOMS server). Rather, this is left up to 
local administrators to decide how the particular roles 
and privileges associated with that VO should be 
interpreted when accessing the resource.  
The decentralized VO role model is more aligned 
with the original dynamic collaborative nature of the 
Grid as first put forward [1]. In this model there is no 
central VO administrator. Instead, each resource site has 
its own local administrator who is 100% responsible for 
determining which VO members can access the local 
VO resources. Each site administrator determines the 
roles and the associated privileges that are required to 
access and use the local resources. However, it would 
not be realistic or scalable to expect each site 
administrator to assign the various roles to all the users 
in the VO. Consequently, they can decide which other 
administrators (at this and other VO sites) are trusted to 
assign which roles to which VO users. In this way they 
may each delegate to each other the responsibility of 
user-role assignments throughout the VO. However the 
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assignment of privileges to roles is always under their 
direct control in their local policy. In the decentralised 
approach, no centralized agreement takes place. Rather, 
dynamic peer to peer collaborations are supported by 
site administrators delegating the necessary privileges to 
the site administrators (and users) of collaborating 
organizations. Underpinning this model are bilateral 
trust agreements between sites. This is the model on 
which the PERMIS authorisation system [9] has been 
built. One can see that the centralised model is a subset 
of the distributed model, in which all sites bilaterally 
trust a single VO administrator. 
Both the centralized and decentralized approaches 
have their advantages and disadvantages. We 
summarize these below and give an outline of when 
each approach is beneficial. In both cases we consider 
RBAC as the mechanism for access control but the 
principles underlying the centralised or decentralised 
models are broadly applicable to some other approaches 
as well, e.g. attribute based access control. 
 
2.1. Pros of Centralized VO Role Model 
The centralized VO role model, such as that based on 
VOMS, has several advantages. Firstly it is widely 
accepted across the Grid community e.g. VOMS has 
been accepted by many large scale mainstream HPC-
oriented Grid communities. Consequently good tool 
support exists for the central management of these roles, 
such as VOMRS [24] which allows multiple managers 
to assign roles to members of the VO, and for end users 
to see which roles they have been allocated.  
Furthermore, tools such as voms_proxy_init exist for 
embedding these roles into proxy certificates and for 
pushing them to the resource sites. Other 
complementary tools exist for extracting the roles from 
the proxy certificates at the resource site. 
The centralized VO model is ideally suited when 
large scale, primarily static VOs are needed. Here static 
implies that the roles and end users with those roles do 
not change rapidly across the VO. The interpretation 
and mapping of those roles to local resources may well 
change more frequently however. Thus through 
technologies such as LCMAPS/LCAS a local system 
administrator is able to decide which local pooled 
accounts and file storage is made available to members 
of that VO in a dynamic manner. If a user’s privileges 
are to be revoked, then the VO administrator can simply 
remove the roles assigned to this user in the VOMS 
server, with the consequence that the user’s roles are no 
longer recognized across the whole VO.  
Given that the VO roles are agreed by all sites up 
front when establishing the VO, the centralized model is 
simpler to define and agree upon. This model does not 
depend on the aggregation of numerous bilateral 
agreements between VO partners where roles and 
associated trust levels are defined. Rather roles are 
defined globally across the VO, based upon a VO-wide 
collaborative agreement. The assignment of these roles 
to individuals is then made by a designated VO-
manager – typically the VOMS administrator (although 
the manager role can be shared by several people). This 
super-role is responsible for deciding which users can 
be assigned which roles across the VO. The knowledge 
of all possible users involved in the VO and their roles 
implies a lack of scalability with this model. However, 
we note that moderately large VO infrastructures have 
been established adopting this model. For example, the 
VO for the ATLAS project 
(http://www.usatlas.bnl.gov/) has over 1500 members 
with a variety of different roles.  
The centralized VO role model, or more precisely 
agreement on a core set of roles, is also aligned with the 
principle behind the definition of the eduPerson 
attribute set (www.educause.edu/eduperson/) for use 
with technologies such as the Internet2 Shibboleth 
(shibboleth.internet2.edu). Through widespread 
definition and agreement of the roles to be used across a 
federation, these may then be delivered and used in a 
variety of ways.  
The centralized role model is also well aligned with 
HPC-oriented models of Grid usage. Thus, mapping of 
VOMS user roles to local pooled accounts on large 
scale clusters is their typical modus operandi. 
Restricting access to particular data sets is typically not 
required. The centralized model is also quite flexible in 
that the low level detailed policy definition is left open 
to interpretation by individual sites. Thus a site may 
decide whether given roles will be recognized or not, 
and if so how, e.g. what pooled accounts they should be 
mapped to. Given that LCMAPS/LCAS have been 
targeted at the pooled account level, this means that this 
model of security supports communities who wish to 
develop their own programs and run them across 
clusters (albeit in given VO-specific accounts). Thus 
this model supports tinkerers and HPC-oriented 
communities who do not simply require access to 
known services.   
 
2.2 Cons of Centralized VO Role Model 
The centralised VO role model based on VOMS also 
has its disadvantages. Having a single VOMS server is a 
single point of failure. Should this resource become 
unavailable for whatever reason, then no resources 
across the VO will be accessible. 
Having a centralised VO administration model also 
has potential drawbacks. For larger scale VOs, it is 
unlikely that a single administrator will have the 
detailed knowledge to decide whether a given remote 
end user should have a particular role or not. For 
smaller scale VOs this may not be a problem but as VOs 
scale both in terms of their number of users and the 
frequency at which privileges are assigned/revoked or 
new privileges added, this model becomes more 
difficult to scale. It is for this reason that tools such as 
VOMRS have added support for multiple people to 
perform the role of VOMS administrator. Note however 
that each role occupant is a full VOMS administrator 
and can therefore undo or redo the role assignments of 
other administrators. Consequently, conflicts between 
administrators have to be solved outside the model. 
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Whilst it is relatively straightforward for a VOMS-
administrator to add a new role to an existing VO, the 
roll-out and interpretation of this by all the resource 
sites e.g. through LCMAPS/LCAS mapping this new 
role to an appropriate local account, may still cause 
scalability issues.  
 
2.3 Pros of De-centralized VO Role Model 
The decentralised model of VO’s has several 
advantages. Firstly, it allows for more dynamic 
collaborations to occur. Thus rather than all sites having 
to agree on VO-wide roles and develop associated 
policies, the decentralised model allows a resource 
administrator to directly provide end users and trusted 
end user administrators with the privileges they need to 
enable access to his resource. New VO roles do not 
need to be created and assigned to end users, their 
existing roles can be used.  
Supporting this model only requires trust to exist 
between pairs of collaborating administrators and this is 
probably much easier to establish than trust between 
every administrator and a single external centralised VO 
administrator. It may be simply realised through 
delegation of authority, whereby a resource 
administrator delegates to a remote (trusted) 
administrator the privilege to issue to a subset of VO 
users a subset of the roles needed to access their 
resources. The Delegation Issuing Service (DIS) from 
the Dynamic Virtual Organizations for e-Science 
Education (DyVOSE) project [25] 
(www.nesc.ac.uk/hub/projects/dyvose) provides one 
implementation of such a delegation of authority model. 
The decentralised model is more scalable than the 
centralised model since there is no limit to the number 
of remote trusted administrators that can be delegated 
the task of assigning roles to users, and since each has a 
limited scope of operation, there is no fear of any 
administrator undoing the work of another one.  
The decentralised model is also more reliable in 
associating roles with users, since the assignment of 
roles can be done by remote administrators who are 
based at the same sites as the users, and who therefore 
can be expected to know the users better. This is similar 
to the motivation behind the registration authority (RA) 
concept in PKIs. Thus rather than adopting a single 
central VO-administrator to assign all roles, each site 
involved in the collaboration may appoint their own 
distributed set of administrators to assign different roles 
to different groups of users at different sites. Each 
administrator privilege can be independently granted 
and denied by each resource administrator, thereby 
providing a fine level of granularity for user-role 
assignments. Each site will consequently have its own 
set of local VO-administrators who are responsible for 
assigning to local VO-members the various roles that 
are needed to access resources throughout the VO, i.e. it 
is the local VO-administrators who are authorised by the 
remote resource providers to assign the VO-specific 
roles to their local users. Each site VO administrator is 
therefore considered to be an Attribute Authority (AA), 
and multiple AAs may therefore exist both for each VO 
role and at each VO site. 
The model also has the advantage of being more 
tolerant to partial failures. Thus should any single AA 
fail, the VO itself will persist and some/most end users 
will still be able to access some or all of the VO 
resources. Of course, if the AA that fails is the sole 
provider of the roles for a specific resource then VO 
fault tolerance cannot be guaranteed.  
The model also has the advantage that new VO roles 
do not always need to be created. If an organisation 
joins a VO, and an existing group of employees within 
the organisation are all to become members of the VO, 
then the role that confers the existing group membership 
may be used by the VO to grant access to this group to 
VO resources. This simply requires a VO resource 
administrator to recognise (or add) this role into its 
policy and assign the appropriate permissions to this 
already-existing role. This is in fact how credit card 
authorisation works today. When a new retail outlet 
(resource) comes on line, it simply trusts the credit card 
roles that already exist. 
The decentralised VO model is much more flexible. 
New resources and roles can be provided on the fly, in 
an incremental fashion between collaborating partners. 
Similarly sub-groups of users can be excluded on the fly 
by removing trust from their administrator (AA) who 
assigned their roles, without removing the role from 
either the VO or from other users who have had the 
same role assigned by other (still trusted) AAs. Sites 
may make their own local decisions, based on whatever 
local information is to hand, whether to define new 
roles, use existing roles, change or revoke existing roles, 
trust new administrators, or give greater or less trust to 
existing administrators etc.  
Decentralised models based upon technologies such 
as PERMIS allow for finer grained access control to be 
supported – in comparison to the VOMS based 
approach of mapping a user role to a particular gid/uid 
and pooled account. Instead PERMIS allows for policies 
based upon the combination of roles, targets and 
actions to be defined. A typical scenario here is “can 
this user with this role access this service and invoke 
this method”. Through definition of such site specific 
policies finer grained access control can be defined. 
Thus end users will not typically be tinkerers as 
described in section 2.1 but service users. 
Tool support now exists to support the decentralised 
model of VO roles. The PERMIS toolset in particular 
has extensions to allow the secure creation and 
delegation of roles which directly map onto the 
decentralised VO role model. 
 
2.4 Cons of De-centralized VO Role Model 
The decentralised model of VO roles is not without its 
disadvantages. One of the major problems with this 
model is that the roles associated with the VO are 
potentially scattered across numerous locations, being 
provided as they are by numerous AAs. Where should 
users go to in order to obtain the necessary roles that are 
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needed to grant them access? This problem is less 
severe with the centralised model, which only has a 
central server, although a user who is a member of 
several centralised VOs still has some choices to make. 
One solution is for resource providers to support the 
pull model of role collection since it removes the burden 
from the end users. Since the resource administrators 
determine which AAs they trust to issue which roles to 
whom, they are able to configure AA meta-data into 
their resource gatekeepers that provide instructions 
where to go to, in order to pull the various user roles 
that are needed. But a consequence of this is that 
maximum rather than least privileges results. Achieving 
least privileges with user push of roles will require 
either all users to know where all of their roles are 
located, or the AAs to distribute the signed roles to their 
users, as is done today with public key certificates. 
Another issue with decentralised models is how do 
the VO-specific roles get defined and made known to 
the sites where they need to be assigned to users? They 
could be defined collaboratively by resource provider 
and user sites, or VOs could centrally define all the 
roles that will apply throughout the VO, but the model 
does not require this. One approach to achieving this is 
the Delegation Issuing Service (DIS) developed within 
the DyVOSE project. The DIS is a web service that 
allows role assignments and delegation to be performed 
from anywhere by anyone who can successfully 
authenticate to it (via PKI) and who has the necessary 
permissions. An Apache server front end to DIS allows 
users without PKI credentials to authenticate to Apache 
which then acts as a proxy for the user. The DIS allows 
role management to be delegated to other administrators 
in the privilege management infrastructure. The 
application of the DIS to decentralised role management 
was validated in the e-learning domain, but it can be 
generalised to other application domains. More 
information on the DIS is given in [13]. 
One final non-technical disadvantage with the 
decentralised VO role model is that it represents a new 
paradigm for the mainstream Grid community. As such, 
its uptake and exploitation has not been as great as with 
VOMS. However, distributed role management is the 
reality of the world today, and given the supporting 
tools and move towards Shibboleth based access to Grid 
resources through projects such as GridShib 
(gridshib.globus.org), ShibGrid [14] and Shebangs [15] 
and GLASS (www.nesc.ac.uk/hub/projects/glass), the 
decentralised model is becoming increasingly relevant. 
The ideal scenario might be to combine the benefits 
of the centralised VO model, ala VOMS (which has 
wide adoption) with technologies that support the 
decentralised model in order to provide a hybrid 
approach where either or both models can co-exist 
together, thereby providing a finer grained, scalable and 
more manageable access control infrastructure. Within 
the JISC funded VPMan project 
(http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/vpman/) we are exploring how 
this can be achieved – specifically through the 
combination of VOMS and PERMIS. 
 
3. Implementation of a Hybrid Centralised-
Decentralised VO Role Model 
The initial focus of the VPMan project is to combine 
VOMS and PERMIS to provide a centralised VO role 
management system with the fine grained access 
controls of PERMIS. We recognised that integration 
with existing and widely adopted Grid middleware is 
essential in order to painlessly migrate users to more 
flexible solutions. The secondary focus will be to 
introduce distributed role management so that users will 
be able to successfully combine their roles which have 
been issued by different distributed AAs. This will be a 
generalisation of the specific solution currently being 
implemented in the Grid-Shib project. In our 
implementation efforts thus far, we have focused 
predominantly upon implementation of scenarios within 
the Globus toolkit version 4 (GT4) and with OMII-UK. 
 
3.1 GT4 Implementation 
The Globus technologies have had widespread adoption 
by the Grid and e-Science communities. The latest 
version of Globus is GT4. The authorization framework 
associated with GT4 provides capabilities to plugin a 
series of interceptors to process each request when it is 
received, i.e. before it reaches the protected application. 
Two types of interceptors are of interest from an 
authorization perspective: Policy Information Points 
(PIPs) and Policy Decisions Points (PDPs). The main 
task of a PIP is to prepare an appropriate component of 
the request context ready for it to be passed to the PDP 
for an access control decision. Typically there will be a 
PIP to prepare each of: the subject’s attributes, the 
action’s attributes, the resource’s attributes and the 
environmental attributes. The relationship between 
PIPs, PDPs and the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) 
with GT4, PERMIS and VOMS is shown in Figure 1. 
VOMS is integrated with the Globus Toolkit so that 
the user’s roles encoded as X.509 attribute certificates 
(ACs) can be passed around embedded in X.509 proxy 
certificates. A GT4 VOMS PIP allows GT4 to access 
and process the VOMS ACs  (the Subject PIP in Figure 
1). The VOMS PIP extracts the VOMS ACs from the 
proxy certificate, parses and stores the roles in the GT 
runtime so that they may subsequently be used by PDPs 
for making authorisation decisions. 
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Figure 1: GT4 VOMS-PERMIS Integration 
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The PERMIS Credential Validation Service (CVS) 
intercepts these roles and uses its policy to decide if 
they were correctly assigned by a trusted AA. In the 
current policy there is only one trusted AA, the 
centralised VOMS server, but in future policies there 
will be a distributed set of trusted AAs. The PERMIS 
CVS has the ability to pull additional roles from 
distributed AAs and merge them with the pushed ones, 
and this will be used to support the distributed role 
model. VOMS roles may then be picked up from a 
VOMS SAML service given the DN of the user.  The 
valid set of user roles is passed back to the GT runtime 
for passing to the PDP (or other PIPs, depending upon 
the GT4 configuration).  
Current PIP implementations usually package the 
various subject, action, resource and environmental 
attributes in a standard XACML request context format 
[16] so that they can be passed to any XACML 
conformant PDP. The PERMIS PDP also has an 
XACML wrapper interface, so that it can be swapped 
for an XACML PDP when needed.  
To actually secure a GT4 service, it should be 
configured so that the required PIPs as well as a PDP 
must be called before access is granted. These PIPs will 
create the various components of an XACML request 
context and once all required information is collected, 
the PDP is passed a completed XACML request 
context. A protected GT4 service is configured with a 
security configuration and a service configuration. The 
former indicates the authorisation and authentication 
methods. In the authorisation method description, the 
PIPs and PDP are specified in the format of 
<identifier>:<java module> where identifier specifies a 
certain scope and java module is the full name of the 
java module which implements a PIP or PDP. The 
identifier for a PIP/PDP is used to differentiate between 
module instances and the parameters that need to be 
passed to each instance. Other services may use the 
same modules but with different configurations by using 
different identifiers. We note that the system has been 
designed to be extensible so that other PIPs or PDPs 
may be added to the authorisation chain. 
 
3.2 OMII-UK Implementation  
OMII-UK was created to establish and maintain Grid 
middleware for the UK e-Science community. The 
OMII software stack incorporates a rich set of software 
for service development, discovery and management, 
for workflows based on the Taverna workflow 
environment (www.mygrid.org.uk) and for management 
of e-Science data sets through technologies such as 
OGSA-DAI (www.ogsadai.org.uk). A variety of newly 
commissioned projects have also been funded 
identifying particular needs for the wider research 
community, e.g. for visualisation 
(www.nesc.ac.uk/hub/projects/omii-rave) or finer 
grained security via Shibboleth 
(www.nesc.ac.uk/hub/projects/omii-sp). 
The currently supported security model within the 
OMII-software stack is primarily based upon web 
service security models. These are used to provide 
secure access to a variety of services including 
GridSAM (gridsam.sourceforge.net) which is itself 
targeted at job submission and monitoring across a 
range of computational resources. The OMII-AuthZ 
project has provided an implementation that supports 
the OGF AuthZ SAML callout API [17]. Details of how 
this API was both linked to Grid middleware and 
exploited more generally are described in [8]. 
The system architecture depicting how VOMS and 
PERMIS are being integrated within the OMII-UK 
technologies is depicted in Figure 2. 
 
OMII 
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OMII
client
Ok/NotOk
2
VOMS
GridSAM
SGE
Condor
NGS/
ScotGrid
MyProxy
GridSAM
WS-security = Message Level Security,
e.g. digitally sign service invocation with X509 cert
PDP
PEP
PIP
voms-proxy-init
Collect 
Attributes
VOMS 
validated 
attributes
X509 proxy credential 
+VOMS attributes appended
 Figure 2: OMII-UK VOMS-PERMIS Integration 
In this infrastructure, the typical scenario is where an 
end user creates an X509 proxy certificate with a 
VOMS attribute certificate embedded, either through 
voms-proxy-init or via the Acacia software [18]. Upon 
attempting to invoke a PERMIS protected service, the 
VOMS attribute certificates are extracted from the 
X.509 proxy certificate which is transferred as part of 
the Job Submission and Description Language (JSDL) 
[19] message and validated using the PERMIS CVS and 
PIP through similar mechanisms described previously in 
the GT4 scenario. These VOMS attributes are then used 
by the PDP to decide which end resources the job has 
permission to be submitted to. 
4. Case Studies 
 To demonstrate how we have incorporated the 
advantages of the centralised VO role model with 
technologies primarily established for decentralised VO 
role management, we focus on two case studies: the 
MRC funded pilot project Virtual Organizations for 
Trials and Epidemiological Studies (VOTES - 
www.nesc.ac.uk/hub/projects/votes) and the EPSRC 
funded pilot project Meeting the Design Challenges of 
nanoCMOS Electronics (nanoCMOS – 
www.nanocmos.ac.uk). 
 
4.1 Clinical Trials and Epidemiological Domain 
Clinical trials and clinical systems more generally place 
many demands upon security infrastructures to support 
the various activities involved. In particular, the typical 
processes involved in a clinical trial will comprise 
recruitment, collection of data specific to the trial and 
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overall management of the trial itself, e.g. to ensure that 
it is undertaken according to ethical concerns. 
Fine grained security is essential in this context to 
ensure that the right data is made available to the right 
people for the right purpose. A key aspect of the work is 
that VOTES is not concerned with developing a single 
Grid infrastructure for a specific clinical trial or study, 
but with developing a Grid based framework through 
which a multitude of clinical trials can be supported. 
There is a multitude of clinical resources already 
available containing clinical information across 
Scotland including: GPASS - used by 85% of GPs; 
Scottish Care Information store - used by most health 
trusts across Scotland; and Scottish Morbidity Records - 
containing aggregated clinical data over 25 years 
including cancer registrations, disease registries and 
death data sets to name just some. The architecture used 
within VOTES is described in more detail in [20-22].  
The typical security mechanism in VOTES involves 
a call-out to a third party database containing the 
various access rights that the different roles within the 
infrastructure have. Conceptually, the access matrix 
represents the privileges assigned for the entire Clinical 
Virtual Organisation (CVO), but is in essence an 
aggregation of all the local resource access policies. 
This relates to the centralized model of security, where 
one policy describes all nodes. In practice however, this 
is a difficult model to implement, partly because of the 
heterogeneity of the different data resources, and partly 
because of a lack of trust between partners in adopting a 
new security system. As such, a requirement of this 
project is to be able to combine security policies of local 
resources, with an overarching policy that requires a 
pluggable interface, rather than subscribing to a set 
global schema. 
Versions of this framework utilize GT4, OGSA-
DAI, GridSphere and PERMIS. To exploit VOMS and 
PERMIS, a new trial was established focused upon 
support of a diabetes clinical study. This trial identified 
two key roles: VOTESdiabetes-doctor and 
VOTESdiabetes-nurse. These roles were recorded in a 
VOTESdiebetes VO maintained in a VOMS server at 
NeSC. The data sources used in this study included 
SCIstore; the Community Health Index database and a 
Consent database for patients who have agreed to 
partake in the study. The roles provide access to fixed 
pre-agreed queries (stored procedures) which must 
strictly adhere to the trial protocol. To show how 
VOMS and PERMIS could be combined five separate 
stored procedures were implemented providing access 
to either demographic but non-clinical data (for nurses) 
or for more clinically oriented data (for doctors). We 
note that these roles are specific to the VOTESdiabetes 
trial only. To understand how VOMS/PERMIS work 
together, we consider the typical sequence of steps: 
1. A user creates an X.509 proxy certificate with 
appropriate VOMS attributes embedded, e.g. through 
voms-proxy-init as below: 
voms-proxy-init –voms \ 
votesdiabetes:/votesdiabetes/Role=nurse-cert 
This step can also be achieved using the Acacia tool. 
2. The user tries to invoke the service that gives access 
to the protected stored procedure; 
3. This invocation is intercepted by the PEP which 
passes the user information including the proxy 
certificate and appended attributes to the VOMS PIP; 
4. The VOMS PIP extracts and validates the credentials 
and passes back a VOMS Fully Qualified Attribute 
Name (FQAN) with the subject attributes; 
5. The PEP calls the PERMIS PDP pushing the request 
information and credentials; 
6. The PERMIS PDP will then, according to the policy, 
decide if this user with the presented attributes is 
authorized to access the service; 
7. If they are authorised the stored procedure is invoked, 
the federated query run and the resultant data sets joined 
on the CHI number and returned to the end user. 
This system has shown how VOMS and PERMIS 
can be combined to provide secure access to federated 
clinical data, however many domains require secure fine 
grained access to HPC computational resources.  
 
4.2 nanoCMOS Electronics Domain 
For next generation nanoCMOS electronics design, the 
quantum level effects of devices of ever decreasing 
dimensions are becoming ever more important and 
atomistic simulation of devices is essential. The 
nanoCMOS project is developing an infrastructure 
through which device level designs and simulations can 
be linked through to higher level circuit and system 
simulations, to predict the overall behaviour of 
nanoCMOS systems. However, this domain demands 
infrastructures that support protection of intellectual 
property, be it for designs of transistors, data sets, 
simulation codes or circuit/systems designs, hence fine 
grained security is essential. 
For the development of the Grid infrastructure the 
project has aligned itself with the OMII-UK 
technologies. The early phase of the work focused upon 
developing a family of OMII-UK services which 
support the device modelling and compact model 
generation phases of electronics design. These services 
were developed to exploit the OMII-UK GridSAM job 
submission system.  
To support VOMS integration in the nanoCMOS 
domain, a nanoCMOS VO was established in a VOMS 
server at NeSC. In this, several key roles were 
established: deviceModeller and circuitSimulator roles.  
These roles were used within vanilla VOMS scenarios 
to map end users within the nanoCMOS domain to 
appropriate pooled accounts and gids/uids for the 
nanoCMOS project. This used vanilla VOMS scenarios 
with the ScotGrid (www.scotgrid.ac.uk) resource. 
In addition, work is on-going in providing 
authorisation capabilities to GridSAM itself. The aim of 
GridSAM is to provide a web service for submitting and 
monitoring jobs managed by a variety of Distributed 
Resource Managers (DRM). This web service interface 
allows jobs to be submitted from a client in a JSDL 
document and supports their status retrieval as a 
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chronological list of events detailing the state of the job. 
GridSAM translates the submission instruction into a set 
of resource-specific actions: file staging, launching and 
monitoring using DRM connectors for each stage. A 
variety of resource specific DRM connectors are 
available including connectors for Condor, Sun Grid 
Engine and Globus. The work is currently focused on 
supporting the Globus DRM connector for the 
GRAMSubmissionStage part of the DRM connector 
sequence. Here authorisation is decided before the JSDL 
document is submitted to the GridSAM instance and 
converted to a Globus specific Resource Specification 
Language document and submitted to a GRAM 
manager. This is achieved through extraction of the 
VOMS attributes from the GridSAM invocation 
(themselves embedded in the JSDL document) and 
using these to authorise access to specific connectors.  
However one issue we have identified in the 
realisation of this model of security is the need for both 
service level and resource level security. That is, the 
authorisation step at the GridSAM::DRM connector 
level will ensure that only authorised individuals can 
submit to the remote resources accessible via those 
DRM connectors. However, it is ultimately the end 
resource itself, e.g. the NGS nodes, which need to make 
authorisation decisions. Thus with GridSAM-only 
authorisation,  jobs at the back end appear as “normal” 
jobs when submitted to the NGS resources, i.e. basic 
Globus jobs submitted using RSL syntax. To address 
this we are looking at transferring VOMS information 
with the job itself. In this case, the authorisation will be 
made both by the protected GridSAM service and the 
remote resource provider itself in mapping the request 
via LCMAPS/LCAS to the appropriate pooled accounts. 
  
5. Conclusions 
The models and implementations presented in this paper 
present alternatives ways that VO security models for 
Grids can be built and their advantages and 
disadvantages. Both the centralised and distributed 
models have their advantages and disadvantages which 
we have enumerated. We have also shown how 
centralised VO models can be harmonised with 
decentralised approaches to gain the best of both 
worlds. This has been shown to be viable in leading 
Grid middleware in large scale security-oriented Grid 
projects. We note that scenarios supporting federated 
role management/access control have been described in 
detail in our work within the e-Learning domain [6] as 
part of the JISC funded DyVOSE project.   
One aspect of our work that we are acutely aware of 
is the need to shield end users from the complexity of 
the underlying Grid technologies, and also to educate 
system administrators on how best to establish and 
maintain secure VOs. Our research is still on-going and 
much more remains to be done. Different kinds of 
VOMS-SAML push/pull models for attributes needed 
for PERMIS based security, and alignment with 
Shibboleth based access ideas are under exploration 
where trusted identity providers, i.e. from sites within 
the VO, are used for authentication and to provide 
VOMS attributes used for authorisation by service 
providers. The scoping of trusted identity providers and 
the attributes they provide has already been 
demonstrated within the OMII SPAM-GP project at 
NeSC Glasgow [23].  
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